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Abstract
Most decisions concerning (self-)insurance and self-protection have to be
taken in situations in which a) the effort exerted precedes the moment uncertainty realises, and b) the probabilities of future states of the world are not
perfectly known. By integrating these two characteristics in a simple theoretical framework, this paper derives plausible conditions under which ambiguity
aversion raises the demand for (self-)insurance and self-protection. In particular, it is shown that in most usual situations where the level of ambiguity does
not increase with the level of effort, a simple condition of ambiguity prudence
known as decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion (DAAA) is sufficient to give
a clear and positive answer to the question: Does ambiguity aversion raise the
optimal level of effort?
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Introduction

Self-insurance and self-protection (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972) are two well-known
and extensively studied risk management tools used to deal with the risk of facing a
monetary loss when market insurance is not available. In both situations, a decision
maker (DM) has the opportunity to undertake an effort to modify the distribution
of a given risk. In particular, the self-insurance effort corresponds to the amount
of money invested to reduce the size of the loss occurring in the bad state of the
world, while the self-protection effort (also called prevention) is the amount invested
to reduce the probability of suffering from the loss. Examples of such efforts may be
found in many every day life situations as well as in many different economic fields.
From the installation of an airbag system in a car, or investments in adaptation1
efforts to fight global climate change in the case of self-insurance, to the attendance
of driving safety lessons, or investments in mitigation2 efforts in the case of selfprotection.
Though these models have received a great deal of attention in the recent literature, it is worth noting that they have, until now, generally been studied only in
simple one-period, two-state settings remaining in the expected utility framework.
Although these relatively simple monoperiodic models were well adapted to understand the key properties of the self-insurance/self-protection tools in situations of
risk, they appear too restrictive to describe a large number of important issues in at
least two aspects. First, there are many situations requiring self-insurance or selfprotection in real life, in which the decision to make an effort and the realization of
uncertainty do not take place at the same time (consider for instance the examples
above). A long period of time may pass between these two events, leading to the
necessity of taking intertemporal considerations into account and building multiperiod models. The second limitation is that most of the models studied in the
literature remain in the expected utility framework, and are therefore unable to deal
with other kinds of uncertainty besides risk 3 . In many real-life problems however,
1

“Adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In
human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (IPCC,
2014a).
2
“Mitigation is a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse
gases”(IPCC, 2014b).
3
The probability distributions are therefore assumed to be known with certainty. In particular,
those models implicitly assume the absence of any kind of ambiguity, or equivalently, assume that
agents are ambiguity-neutral (and therefore behave as subjective expected utility maximizers in
the sense of Savage (1954)). Notably exceptions to this are the recent papers by Snow (2011) and
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the nature of the uncertainty considered cannot be limited to risk since the probabilities associated with the realisation of uncertain events cannot always be objectively
known. In these kinds of situation, ambiguity plays a central role, and the attitude
agents generally manifest towards this additional source of uncertainty needs to be
taken into account. The subjective expected utility theory that assumes ambiguity
neutrality is therefore inconsistent in this context. Indeed, as first shown by Ellsberg
(1961) and later confirmed by a number of experimental studies4 , the uncertainty on
the probabilities of a random event (called ambiguity) often leads the decision maker
to violate the reduction of compound lotteries axiom in the sense that it makes him
over-evaluate less desirable outcomes. It is therefore important to take this individual behavior (called ambiguity aversion) into account when considering problems in
the presence of ambiguity. As an additional example, consider the following case.
A young man faces the risk of developing heart disease when he is older, but he
can choose whether or not to practice sport in his youth as a preventive measure.
Sport is costly, but it can either reduce the probability of heart disease with which
a potentially important fixed loss is associated (self-protection), or it can reduce the
severity of a disease that develops with a fixed probability (self-insurance)5 . While
it is clear that many years may separate the moment at which the effort decision is
taken and the moment at which the uncertainty is realised, an additional difficulty,
in such a situation, is that at the time the decision is taken of doing sport on a regular basis or not, the probability of developing a heart disease at old age is unknown6 .
In this paper, I present models of self-insurance and self-protection that are able
to overcome the above-mentioned limitations. Each model takes the form of a simple two-period model incorporating the theory Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005, 2009) developed to deal with ambiguity. The timing of the decision process
is simple: in the first period, a DM chooses the level of effort he wants to exert in
order to affect either the probability of being in a state in which ambiguity is concentrated in the second period, or to affect the level of wealth in this ambiguous state.
Using this setting, I derive the conditions under which ambiguity aversion raises the
Alary, Gollier, and Treich (2013).
4
See Einhorn and Hogarth (1986), Viscusi and Chesson (1999), and Ho et al. (2002) among
others.
5
Imagine for example that doing sport enables to lower recovery costs, thanks to a better
physical condition.
6
Depending on the value of some parameters such as the blood pressure, cholesterol, etc. different institutes will estimate this probability very differently, as is illustrated in Gilboa and Marinacci
(2011).

3

demand for insurance, self-insurance and self-protection. In particular, I show that
when the effort is undertaken during the first period, ambiguity aversion tends to
have a positive impact on the demand for (self-)insurance and self-protection. However, as for the study of risk attitude in which risk aversion alone is not sufficient to
guarantee a higher level of prevention (since risk prudence is also needed), I show
that the extra condition of ambiguity prudence attitude is also needed to observe
this positive impact. Contrary to the conflicting results obtained in the one-period
settings (Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 2005), the close relationship that is achieved between prudence and prevention in the two-period setting (Menegatti, 2009) is then
re-established in the presence of ambiguity.
This paper is therefore both an extension of the research on self-insurance and
self-protection under ambiguity initiated by Snow (2011) and Alary, Gollier, and
Treich (2013) in the sense that it goes from the study of the one- to the two-period
problem, but also of Menegatti (2009) as it allows for non neutral ambiguity attitudes. Except from the fact that the results concerning self-insurance under ambiguity are shown to be easily extended to the two-period case, the particular interest
of this approach is that it enables to treat the most plausible situations in which
the effort of self-protection does not go together with an increase in the degree of
ambiguity (think for example to the security, climate change and health examples).
In that sense and contrarily to the results obtained in Alary, Gollier, and Treich
(2013)7 , this paper enables to give, for most usual situations, a clear answer to the
question: Does ambiguity aversion raise the optimal level of effort?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the
simple two-period model under ambiguity by studying the problem of full insurance.
Then in succession, I analyze the willingness to pay (Section 3) and the optimal effort
(Section 4) for self-insurance and self-protection. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2

Full Insurance in the Two-Period Model

The model involves ambiguity: probabilities of the second-period final wealth
are not objectively known, instead they consist of a set of probabilities, depending
7

These authors themselves recognize that the results they obtain for self-protection concern only
a restricted, rather implausible, range of situations by noting that “in many situations, it appears
more natural that self-protection would reduce both risk and ambiguity”.
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on an external parameter θ for which the decision maker (DM) has prior beliefs8 .
Ambiguity may therefore be interpreted as a multi-stage lottery: a first lottery
determines the value of parameter θ, and a second one determines the size of secondperiod wealth. The second-period wealth distribution w̃2 (θ) is represented by the
vector [w2,1 , w2,2 , ..., w2,n ; p1 (θ), p2 (θ), ..., pn (θ)] with w2,1 < w2,2 < · · · < w2,n .
In the time-separable model, the intertemporal welfare under Klibanoff, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2005, 2009) (KMM) representation is as follows:
n
n
oo
u(w1 ) + βφ−1 Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃)) ,

(1)

where wi is the exogenous wealth in the beginning of period i = 1, 2, u represents the
period vNM utility functions, β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor9 , φ represents attitude
towards ambiguity, Eθ is the expectation operator taken over the distribution of
θ, conditional on all information available during the first period, and E is the
expectation operator taken over w2 conditional on θ. The function φ is assumed to
be three times differentiable, increasing, and concave under ambiguity aversion, so
that the φ-certainty equivalent in equation (1) is lower in that case than when the
individual is ambiguity neutral characterized by a linear function φ10 :
−1

φ

n
n
oo
Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
≤ Eθ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃)) = Eu(w̃2 )

(2)

In that sense, an ambiguity averse DM dislikes any mean-preserving spread in the
space of conditional second period expected utilities.
The right hand side of expression (2) corresponds to the second period welfare obtained by an ambiguity neutral individual who evaluates his welfare by considering
the risky second period wealth w̃2 : [w2,1 , w2,2 , ..., w2,n ; p̄1 , p̄2 , ..., p̄n ] with the mean
state probabilities p̄s = Eθ ps (θ̃), ∀s = 1, ..., n. In that sense, an ambiguity neutral
individual is nothing but a Savagian expected utility agent.
As for the single period model, the study of willingness to pay (WTP) P for risk
8

Imagine that parameter θ can take values θ1 , θ2 , ..., θm with probabilities [q1 , q2P
, ..., qm ], such
m
that the expectation with respect to the parametric uncertainty is written Eθ g(θ̃) = j=1 qj g(θj ).
9
In what follows, I assume that β = 1, an assumption that has no impact on the results obtained.
10
Notice that for simplicity, I assume that φ is only defined for non-negative values. Any value
inside the second bracket must therefore be non-negative, which should not be a problem since
any positive affine transformation of u represents the same preferences over risky situations. KMM
consider for example the unique continuous, strictly increasing function u with u(0) = 0 and
u(1) = 1 that represents any given preferences.
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elimination under ambiguity is straightforward11 . In this case, it corresponds to the
amount an individual is ready to pay in period 1 to escape the uncertainty in period
2, and is defined as follows:
n
n
oo
u(w1 − P ) + u(Ew̃2 ) = u(w1 ) + φ−1 Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
.
If the individual were ambiguity neutral, he would be ready to pay P0 defined by
u(w1 − P0 ) + u(Ew̃2 ) = u(w1 ) + Eu(w̃2 ) to eliminate the same risk. Using inequality
(2), we can then see that P is always higher than P0 under ambiguity aversion in the
two-period model. As in the single period model, ambiguity averse individuals are
therefore ready to pay a higher premium for risk elimination, since the elimination
of the risk automatically eliminates the ambiguity attached to this risk. This extra
premium is the two-period version of the ambiguity premium 12 .

3

Willingness to Pay under Ambiguity

Building on Alary, Gollier, and Treich (2013) (AGT hereafter), I now re-examine
the willingness to pay (WTP) for infinitesimal insurance or protection in the context
of a two-period model. It is assumed that ambiguity is concentrated on a state i. In
this case, the ambiguous probability to be in state i is: pi (θ), while the probability
to be in any other state s 6= i is given by
ps (θ) = (1 − pi (θ))πs ,
where πs is the unambiguous probability of being in state s13 conditional on the
information that the state is not i. Observe that if there are only two states of
nature, this structure reduces to the case with ambiguous probabilities p(θ) and
1 − p(θ). From now on, I also assume, without loss of generality, that θ may be
ranked in such a way that pi is increasing in θ.
11

Note that in the single period model studied by Alary, Gollier, and Treich (2013), this willingness to pay P is what Berger (2011) or Maccheroni et al. (2013) call the uncertainty premium,
which is by definition superior to Pratt’s risk premium under ambiguity aversion.
12
Berger (2011) defines the uncertainty premium as the combination of both the risk and the
ambiguity premia.
P
13
An implicit assumption is that s6=i πs = 1.
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3.1

Self-insurance

Self-insurance in a two-period world is a risk management tool thanks to which
an individual has the opportunity to exert an effort today to reduce a cost in a
specific state i tomorrow. By letting P () denote the willingness to furnish this
effort to increase marginally the wealth in state i and such that the level of welfare
is not altered, we have:
u(w1 − P ()) + φ−1

(

(

Eθ φ pi (θ̃)u(w2,i + ) + [1 − pi (θ̃)]
−1

= u(w1 ) + φ

X
s6=i

πs u(w2,s )

))

n
n
oo
Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
.

Totally differentiating this equation with respect to  and evaluating it at  = 0
leads to
i
n
oh
Eθ φ0 Eu(w̃2 (θ̃)) pi (θ̃)u0 (w2,i )
n
n
ooo
,
(3)
P 0 (0) = n
φ0 φ−1 Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
u0 (w1 )
and the marginal WTP for self-insurance of an ambiguity neutral individual (φ0 ≡
constant) is:
u0 (w2,i )Eθ pi (θ̃)
.
(4)
PN0 (0) =
u0 (w1 )
An ambiguity averse individual has thus a higher marginal WTP to insure state i if
P 0 (0) > PN0 (0). To compare equations (3) and (4) in the most common case of non
increasing ambiguity aversion, I use the following lemma and its corollary:
Lemma 1 (Berger (2014)). Let φ be a three times differentiable function reflecting
ambiguity aversion. If φ exhibits DAAA (Decreasing Absolute Ambiguity Aversion)
then Eφ0 {x̃} > φ0 {φ−1 {Eφ{x̃}}}.
Lemma 1. If φ exhibits CAAA (Constant Absolute Ambiguity Aversion), then
Eφ0 {x̃} = φ0 {φ−1 {Eφ{x̃}}}.
Non increasing absolute ambiguity aversion refers to the notion of ambiguity
prudence attitude. This characteristic, which is stronger than requiring φ000 > 014 ,
has been shown to be sufficient for ambiguity prudence if ambiguity is concentrated
on a particular state i and the agent is risk prudent (u000 > 0) (Berger, 2014).
14

Note that φ being DAAA implies φ000 > 0. The difference between the standard risk and
ambiguity prudence conditions comes from the fact that the intertemporal utility (1) is evaluated
using a φ-certainty equivalent rather than a simple φ-valuation.
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Ambiguity aversion therefore raises the marginal WTP for insurance in state i if
covθ (φ0 {Eu(w̃2 (θ̃)}, pi (θ̃)) > 0 and the individual has an ambiguity prudent attitude.
Since pi is assumed to be increasing in θ, by the covariance rule, and because φ0 is
decreasing under ambiguity aversion, we only need Eu(w̃2 (θ)) to be decreasing in θ.
Decomposing this expression enables us to see that the condition needed is similar
to the one in AGT:
"
#
X
X
Eu(w̃2 (θ)) = −pi (θ)
u(w2,s ) − u(w2,i ) +
u(w2,s )
s6=i

s6=i

and Eu(w̃2 (θ)) is therefore decreasing in θ if ψ defined as the certainty equivalent of
P
second period wealth conditional on the state not being i:
s6=i πs u(w2,s ) = u(ψ),
is higher than second period wealth in state i: w2,i . This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. In the two-period model of self-insurance in which ambiguity is
concentrated on the insured state i, ambiguity aversion raises the marginal WTP
to self-insure state i if the individual manifests DAAA and second period wealth in
state i is smaller than the second period certainty equivalent ψ.
The insight this result provides is analogous to the one resulting from the study
of willingness to pay for an increase in second period wealth in a Kreps and Porteus
(1978)/Selden (1978) model. When the second period wealth in state i is considered
as unfavorable in the sense that the utility obtained in that state is smaller than
his expected utility in the others states, raising w2,i has a positive impact on the
the conditional second period expected utilities Eu(w̃2 (θ)), which is valuable for any
individual with φ0 > 0. However, this raise in w2,i comes with a cost: an effort that
has to be furnished in advance (period 1). In the Kreps-Porteus/Selden model, we
know that risk aversion raises the marginal WTP for an increase in second period
wealth, provided that the individual is prudent. This condition is only satisfied in
that context if the individual manifests decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Given the similarity between Kreps-Porteus/Selden and KMM models, it is therefore
not surprising that ambiguity aversion is no more sufficient in guaranteeing that the
marginal WTP to self-insure state i increases. An additional condition analogous
to prudence is needed. Non increasing absolute ambiguity aversion is this extra
condition in the presence of ambiguity
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3.2

Self-protection

Another tool that may be used to deal with the presence of uncertainty in the
second period is self-protection: an individual has the opportunity to undertake an
effort today, in order to alter the probability of a specific state i tomorrow. In this
subsection, I examine the effect of ambiguity aversion on the marginal willingness
to furnish a self-protection effort in the context of a two-period model.
Proceeding as before, I denote by P () the WTP today for a reduction  in the
probability of state i tomorrow, such that the intertemporal level of welfare is not
modified. Furthermore, following AGT, I assume that the degree of ambiguityis
not altered by the change of pi : pi is equally affected for any value of θ, and the
distribution of second period wealth conditional on the state not being i remains
identical. Mathematically, P () is defined as follows:
u(w1 − P ()) + φ−1

(

Eθ φ

(
h

))
i
h
iX
pi (θ̃) −  u(w2,i ) + 1 − pi (θ̃) + 
πs u(w2,s )
s6=i

n
n
oo
−1
= u(w1 ) + φ
Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃)) .

Totally differentiating this expression with respect to  and evaluating it at  = 0
yields:
hP
i
n
o
0
Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
s6=i u(w2,s ) − u(w2,i ) Eθ φ
n
n
n
ooo
.
(5)
P 0 (0) =
φ0 φ−1 Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
u0 (w1 )

Assuming again that the second period wealth in state i: w2,i is smaller than the
certainty equivalent ψ defined above (i.e that self-protection aims to reduce the
probability of an unfavorable state) so that the marginal WTP is positive, it may
be shown that the marginal WTP to self-protect state i is higher under ambiguity
aversion if:
n
o
n
n
n
ooo
Eθ φ0 Eu(w̃2 (θ̃)) > φ0 φ−1 Eθ φ Eu(w̃2 (θ̃))
.
(6)
According to Lemma 1, this will be the case if the individual exhibits DAAA, while
nder CAAA, the marginal WTP for self-protection in state i remains the same under
ambiguity aversion. Alternatively note also that if w2,i > ψ (i.e if the state to selfprotect is a favorable state and the marginal WTP is negative) results are reversed.
These results prove the following proposition and its corollary.
Proposition 2. In the two-period model of self-protection in which ambiguity is
concentrated on state i, ambiguity aversion raises (reduces) the marginal WTP to
9

self-protect state i under DAAA (IAAA) if second period wealth in state i is smaller
than the second period certainty equivalent ψ, and reduces (raises) it otherwise.
Lemma 2. In the two-period model of self-protection in which ambiguity is concentrated on state i, ambiguity aversion does not modify the marginal WTP to selfprotect state i under CAAA.
These results are different from the single period model, in which under DARA,
ambiguity aversion reduces the marginal WTP to self-protect state i if wealth in
state i is smaller than the precautionary equivalent wealth level conditional on the
state not being i (Proposition 3 in AGT).
The intuition here is similar that made before. As the effect of self-protection on
the probability of state i is identical for any value of θ, and since the distribution of
other states conditional on s 6= i is not modified, raising pi has a positive and equal
impact on conditional second period expected utility Eu(w̃2 (θ)) for all values of θ.
Due to the introduction of ambiguity aversion, the cost of this increase is paid in
the first period so that the extra condition of DAAA is needed to observe a raise in
the marginal WTP to self-protect state i.

4

Optimal Effort under Ambiguity

In this section, I examine the impact of ambiguity aversion on the optimal insurance and protection in favor of state i in a two-period model. The general form
of the decision maker’s problem is given by:
n
n
oo
max u(w1 − e) + φ−1 Eθ φ U (e, θ̃) ,
e

(7)

P
where U (e, θ) = pi (e, θ)u(w2,i (e)) + [1 − pi (e, θ)] s6=i πs u(w2,s ) is the second period
expected utility, conditional on the parameter θ. Notations remain as before15 and
e represents the level of effort needed to self-insure or self-protect state i. Problem
(7) is a problem of self-insurance when pi (e, θ) = pi (θ) for all levels of effort e, and
a problem of self-protection when w2,i (e) = w2,i for all e. I assume that pi (e, θ)
and w2,i (e) are differentiable in e and that when state i is unfavorable, pie (e, θ) ≡
∂w2,i (e)
∂pi (e,θ)
≤ 0 for all θ, and that ∂e
≥ 0. Notice that under KMM specification,
∂e
the concavity of u and φ does not guarantee that the maximization problem (7) is
convex, so additional assumptions are needed for the programme’s solution to be
unique. These conditions are summarized in the following proposition.
15

Remember that β is fixed to unity for simplicity and without altering the final result.
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Proposition 3. The maximization programme of a two-period self-insurance or selfprotection problem under ambiguity as described by (7) is convex if:
• function φ has a concave absolute ambiguity tolerance: −φ0 (U )/φ00 (U ) is concave in U ,
and
• w2,i (e) is concave in e in the self-insurance case: ∂ 2 w2,i (e)/∂e2 ≤ 0, or
• pi (e, θ) is convex in e in the self-protection case: ∂ 2 pi (e, θ)/∂e2 ≥ 0 for all θ.
Proof. Relegated to the Appendix.
In line with the risk theory literature, concave absolute ambiguity tolerance is a
property verified by the most widely-used specifications in the literature. In particular, it is satisfied by the families of constant relative ambiguity aversion (CRAA):
logarithmic and power functions, of constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA):
exponential functions, and of quadratic functions.
In the special case of ambiguity neutrality, problem (7) becomes a simple twoperiod problem in the expected utility framework. It consists of finding the level of
effort e that maximizes:
u(w1 − e) + Eθ U (e, θ̃).
The optimal level of effort e∗ chosen by an ambiguity averse individual is the solution
of the first-order condition (FOC):
−u0 (w1 − e∗ ) + Eθ Ue (e∗ , θ̃) = 0,

(8)

where Ue (e, θ) = ∂U (e, θ)/∂e. The first term of this expression represents the
marginal cost of effort and the second represents the marginal benefits of selfprotection or of self-insurance.
Ambiguity aversion therefore raises the optimal level of effort if the FOC of problem
(7) evaluated at e∗ is positive. This is the case if:
h
i
Eθ φ0 {U (e∗ , θ̃)}Ue (e∗ , θ̃)
n
n
oo ≥ Eθ Ue (e∗ , θ̃).
0
−1
∗
φ φ
Eθ φ{U (e , θ̃)

(9)

The interpretation of this condition is simple: as ambiguity only affects variables
during the second period, the marginal cost of effort, which takes place in the first
11

period, is unaffected and the condition indicates that the marginal benefit of protection or insurance must be higher under ambiguity aversion.
Using Lemma 1 and its corollary, we then see that under CAAA, condition (9) is
equivalent to:


0
∗
∗
covθ φ {U (e , θ̃)}, Ue (e , θ̃) ≥ 0.
(10)

Moreover, condition (9) is always satisfied under DAAA if condition (10) holds. As
φ0 is decreasing under ambiguity aversion, using the covariance rule, the condition
therefore becomes:
Proposition 4. Ambiguity aversion raises the optimal level of effort in a two-period
model as the one described by (7) if U (e∗ , θ) and Ue (e∗ , θ) are anti-comonotonic and
if the individual manifests DAAA, where e∗ is defined by (8).

4.1

Self-insurance

I now investigate the conditions under which this proposition holds in the case
of self-insurance. In this case, we must remember that the individual has the opportunity to make an effort e in the first-period to increase his wealth to w2,i (e) in
the insurable state i in the second period. The conditional second period expected
utility in the case of self-insurance is therefore given by:
U (e, θ) = pi (θ)u(w2,i (e)) + [1 − pi (θ)]

X

πs u(w2,s ).

s6=i

Since pi is assumed to be increasing in θ, it is clear that U (e∗ , θ) decreases with θ if
∂w (e∗ )
w2,i (e∗ ) < ψ, and increases with θ otherwise, while Ue (e∗ , θ) = pi (θ)u0 (w2,i (e∗ )) 2,i
∂e
is increasing in θ. Combining theses results with condition (9) and using Lemma 1
and its corollary proves the following proposition:
Proposition 5. In a two-period model of self-insurance of a state i in which ambiguity is concentrated, ambiguity aversion raises the optimal level of self-insurance
under DAAA if the second period wealth in state i is smaller than the second period
certainty equivalent ψ.
Note that when w2,i (e∗ ) > ψ, no general conclusion may be drawn. In this case,
DAAA may increase or decrease the optimal level of effort.
Lemma 3. In a two-period model of self-insurance of a state i in which ambiguity
is concentrated, ambiguity aversion raises the optimal level of self-insurance under
12

CAAA if the second period wealth in state i is smaller than the second period certainty equivalent ψ, and decreases it otherwise.
Example This result extends to a two period framework the results obtained by
Snow (2011) in the particular case of a world with two states: a loss and a noloss state. Under this assumption, if an insurable loss L occurs, the second period
wealth is w2,i (e∗ ) = w2 − L(e∗ ), and is ψ = w2 in the no-loss state. Snow’s (2011)
results showing that ambiguity aversion increases the optimal level of self-insurance
are then easily extended to a two-period world if the individual manifests CAAA
or DAAA. Finally, if the loss function has the particular form: L(e) = L − ke,
it is also possible to interpret the results in the context of a standard coinsurance
problem where the premium e is paid in first period and for each dollar of which
the insured agent receives an indemnity k if the loss occurs. In this case, ambiguity
aversion raises the insurance coverage rate if the individual manifests non increasing
ambiguity aversion. This result is the two-period version of Corollary 1 in Alary,
Gollier, and Treich (2013) and is synthesized in the following corollary:
Lemma 4. In the standard coinsurance problem with two states in which the insurance premium is paid in first period and uncertainty is realized in second period, ambiguity aversion raises the insurance coverage rate if the individual exhibits
DAAA.

4.2

Self-protection

I now consider the problem of self-protection: the effect of effort is to reduce the
probability pi (e, θ) of an unfavourable state i in which ambiguity is concentrated.
Conditional second period expected utility takes the form:
U (e, θ) = pi (e, θ)u(w2,i ) + [1 − pi (e, θ)]

X

πs u(w2,s ).

s6=i

As before, and without loss of generality, I assume that pi (e∗ , θ) is increasing in θ so
that U (e∗ , θ) is a decreasing function of θ when state i is unfavourable. From Proposition 4, a sufficient condition to observe a higher level of effort under CAAA or DAAA
than under ambiguity neutrality in the self-protection
model, therefore becomes
hP
i that
the marginal benefit of effort Ue (e∗ , θ) = −pie (e∗ , θ)
s6=i πs u(w2,s ) − u(w2,i ) is in∗
creasing in θ. The key element is how −pie (e , θ) evolves with θ, or alternatively
how the degree of ambiguity is affected by a change in the level of effortIf the degree
13

of ambiguity is not altered by a change in the level of effort, as it was the case in
the section studying the willingness to pay, pie (e∗ , θ) is independent of θ and the
covariance in (10) is equal to zero. In this case, an individual manifesting strictly
DAAA will always choose a higher level of self-protection under ambiguity aversion,
while an individual manifesting CAAA will self-protect in exactly the same way as
an ambiguity neutral agent. If on the contrary, the degree of ambiguity decreases
with the level of effort exerted as it seems natural in many situations, pie (e∗ , θ) is
decreasing in θ so that there exists an additional incentive for an ambiguity averse
decision maker to raise self-protection. It is therefore clear that in this situation,
non increasing absolute ambiguity aversion raises the optimal level of effort. Finally,
in the more implausible case where effort increases the level of ambiguity as in AGT,
pie (e∗ , θ) is increasing in θ and the ambiguity prudence attitude effect is not anymore
sufficient to raise optimal self-protection. The following proposition and its corollary
summarize theses results:
Proposition 6. In the two-period problem of self-protection of an unfavourable state
i in which ambiguity is concentrated, DAAA is sufficient to raise the optimal selfprotection effort under ambiguity aversion if effort decreases the degree of ambiguity
of state i.
Lemma 5. In the two-period problem of self-protection of an unfavourable state
i in which ambiguity is concentrated, an agent manifesting DAAA (resp. CAAA)
chooses a higher (similar) level of self-protection than (as) an ambiguity neutral
agent, if effort does not affect the ambiguity of state i.
To illustrate what precedes, consider the following examples.
Examples Imagine there are only two states of the world: a loss and a no-loss
state in which second period wealth is respectively w2 − L with conditional probability p(e, θ), or w2 with probability 1 − p(e, θ). Consider two particular forms
of loss probability functions that are both linear in the ambiguity parameter θ:
p1 (e, θ) = p(e) + θ, and p2 (e, θ) = θp(e).


In the additive case, Ue (e∗ , θ) = −p0 (e∗ ) u(w2 ) − u(w2 − L) so that an increase
in θ has no effect on Ue (e∗ , θ). The level of self-protection is therefore exactly the
same for any individual manifesting constant ambiguity attitude16 . In particular, an
ambiguity neutral individual and a maxmin expected utility maximizer à la Gilboa
16

Remember that according to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), constant ambiguity
attitude is characterized either by linear or exponential function φ.
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and Schmeidler (1989) both choose to self-protect precisely the same way. If the
individual exhibits DAAA, he will always choose a higher level of protection under
ambiguity aversion.
Imagine now that the degree of ambiguity is made smaller
when the "effort in!
∗∗
∗
above, where U(e
= u(w
) −θp(e
u(wthe
Ue (e∗ , θ) =
2 ) −u(w
2 −L) andform
creases described
in the neighbourhood
of e ,. θ)This
is 2the
case )with
multiplicative


!
"
" ∗
described
above,
where
U (e∗ , θ) = u(w )−θp(e∗ ) u(w2 )−u(w
and Uein
(e∗θ, θ)
= have a
2 −L)
−θp
(e
)
u(w
that
an
increase
will
2 ) − u(w2 − L) . 2It is easy to check


−θp0 (e∗ ) u(w2 ) − u(w2 − L) . An increase in θ has therefore a negative impact on U
negative impact on U and a positive impact on Ue so that condition (10) is respected.
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The intuition behind these two examples is simple. In the absence of ambiguity,
to a situation in which ambiguity decreases with the effort furnished and condition
we know that a key determinant of the optimal level of self-protection is the slope
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of p(e) (which determines the marginal
benefit of effort). When ambiguity is intro14

Remark that in this example, p(e) is the loss probability law considered by an ambiguity
neutral agent and that the ambiguity averse DM associates the same prior belief to each value of
θ, in such a way that θ2 = −θ1 in the additive case, and θ2 = 2 − θ1 in the multiplicative case.
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duced, the DM does not know exactly in which situation he is: if his prior beliefs
are equal, he considers he has one chance out of two to be confronted to a loss with
probability p(e, θ1 ), and one chance out of two to have p(e, θ2 ). If the individual
is ambiguity neutral, this situation does not affect him and the decision is taken
by considering the expected law p(e). However, if the agent is ambiguity averse,
he will over-evaluate the less desirable outcome (i.e. the law p(e, θ2 )) and hence
take a decision by considering a law somewhere above the line p(e). In the special
case of infinite ambiguity aversion, corresponding to the Maxmin model of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), the DM takes his decision by considering the worst scenario
p(e, θ2 ).
The study of these two particular cases in which the probability is linear in parameter θ emphasizes the differences there are between the single and the two-period
models. In the single period model, it is indeed impossible to sign the effect ambiguity aversion has on the optimal prevention, even when the probabilities are linear in
the ambiguity parameter. In that situation in particular, the DM will always choose
to reduce his demand of self-protection if the probability law is additive (Alary,
Gollier, and Treich, 2013), while he will choose a higher level of protection if the
probability law is multiplicative (Snow, 2011). This inability to obtain a general
result is due to the fact that both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of
self-protection increase under ambiguity aversion. The net effect therefore depends
on which one is more affected. In the two-period model analyzed in this paper
however, ambiguity aversion only affects the marginal benefit, making it possible to
draw general conclusions for the most plausible situations in which increasing the
effort does not go along with an increase in the degree of ambiguity.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, I show that ambiguity aversion alone is not sufficient to sign the
effect ambiguity has on the decision to (self-)insure or self-protect when two periods
are considered. An additional condition defined as ambiguity prudence attitude – or
non increasing absolute ambiguity aversion – is then studied, and it is shown that
in most usual situations this condition tends to raise the incentive to undertake an
effort (insurance or prevention) in the first period when non neutral attitude towards
ambiguity is considered.
16

This paper thus enables to sign the effect of ambiguity aversion on (self-)insurance
and self-protection under a plausible set of conditions. It is distinguishable from the
other recent papers by Snow (2011) and Alary, Gollier, and Treich (2013) in which
the marginal cost of effort is also affected by ambiguity, and that are therefore not
able to draw general conclusions because of the conflicting effect ambiguity aversion
has on marginal benefit and marginal cost.

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
This proof18 is based on the following Lemma, that
can be found in Gollier (2001).
Lemma 2. Let φ be a twice differentiable, increasing and concave function: R → R.
Pm
Consider a probability vector (q1 , ..., qm ) ∈ Rm
+ with
θ=1 qθ = 1, and a function
f : Rm → R, defined as
f (U1 , ..., Um ) = φ−1

( m
X
θ=1

)

qθ φ {Uθ } .

0

}
. Function f is concave in Rm if and
Let T be the function such that T (U ) = − φφ00{U
{U }
only if T is weakly concave in R.

First, remark that programme (7) is convex if
−1

V (e) = φ

(

(

))
h
iX
Eθ φ pi (e, θ̃)u(w2,i (e)) + 1 − pi (e, θ̃)
πs u(w2,s )
s6=i

is concave in e.
Self-insurance (pi (e, θ) = pi (θ) for all levels of e): Consider two scalars e1 and
e2 , and let Ujθ denote the second period expected utility conditional on θ, for a level
P
of effort ej : Ujθ = pi (θ)u(w2,i (ej )) + [1 − pi (θ)] s6=i πs u(w2,s ). Under the notations
above, V (ej ) = f (Uj1 , ..., Ujm ). Then, under concavity of u and w2,i , and for any
(λ1 , λ2 ) ∈ R2+ such that λ1 + λ2 = 1, we have:
λ1 u(w2,i (e1 )) + λ2 u(w2,i (e2 )) ≤ u(λ1 w2,i (e1 ) + λ2 w2,i (e2 )) ≤ u(w2,i (λ1 e1 + λ2 e2 )).
18

This proof is adapted from Gierlinger and Gollier (2008).
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Multiplying the first and the third parts of this chain of inequalities by pi (θ) and
P
adding [1 − pi (θ)] s6=i πs u(w2,s ) yields:
λ1 U1θ + λ2 U2θ ≤ Uλθ ≡ pi (θ)u(w2,i (eλ )) + [1 − pi (θ)]

X

πs u(w2,s )

s6=i

for all θ, where eλ = λ1 e1 + λ2 e2 . Because f is increasing in Rm if φ is increasing,
this implies:
V (eλ ) = f (Uλ1 , ..., Uλm ) ≥ f (λ1 U11 + λ2 U21 , ..., λ1 U1m + λ2 U2m ).
On the other side, if −φ0 /φ00 is concave, by Lemma 2 we have:
f (λ1 U11 + λ2 U21 , ..., λ1 U1m + λ2 U2m ) ≥ λ1 f (U11 , ..., U1m ) + λ2 f (U21 , ..., U2m )
= λ1 V (e1 ) + λ2 V (e2 ).
Combining these two results yields V (λ1 e1 + λ2 e2 ) ≥ λ1 V (e1 ) + λ2 V (e2 ) implying
that V is concave in e.
Self-protection (w2,i (e) = w2,i for all levels of e): In this case, the proof is
P
similar but Ujθ is now given by Ujθ = pi (ej , θ)u(w2,i ) + [1 − pi (ej , θ)] s6=i πs u(w2,s ),
and we exploit the convexity of pi (e, θ) in e to obtain λ1 U1θ + λ2 U2θ ≤ Uλθ .

18
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